Gender Apartheid and the Criminalization of Women’s Singing in Iran

Maral Hamzehloo

The concept of gender apartheid is gaining recognition in international legal and human-rights discourse as a way to describe state-enforced systems that segregate, subordinate, and exclude individuals based on gender. Unlike generalized discrimination, gender apartheid refers to legally codified practices that systematically separate and restrict women’s participation in public life through formal laws and institutional enforcement. This framework is increasingly applied to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where gender functions not only as a social category but also as a legal one embedded in the very structure of the state.

A particularly revealing example is Iran’s prohibition of solo singing by women in public or in front of mixed-gender audiences, a restriction that has been in place since the 1979 revolution. Recent prosecutions of three Iranian women singers—Parastoo Ahmady, Zara Esmaeili, and Hiwa Seyfizade- illustrate how this legal structure is enforced.

Parastoo Ahmady was charged after posting a solo performance to YouTube in which she appeared without the mandatory hijab. Although the performance was recorded in a private space with no live audience, authorities deemed it a violation of modesty laws and “unauthorized cultural activity.” Her case shows how the state’s surveillance now extends deeply into digital spaces: even private artistic acts are treated as threats to public morality when performed by women.

In Karaj, Zara Esmaeili was arrested after a video of her singing Back to Black by Amy Winehouse without a hijab circulated online. Her detention was not based on the lyrics or musical content but on her visible defiance of gendered expectations of dress and presence. Here, the act of performance itself was criminalized, not because of what was expressed, but because of who was performing and how she was seen.

Hiwa Seyfizade, a Kurdish artist, was arrested during a live event in Tehran and charged with unauthorized solo singing, a clear violation of cultural law prohibiting women from leading public performances. Her Kurdish identity added another layer of vulnerability, reflecting how women from ethnic minority backgrounds often face heightened scrutiny and fewer legal protections.

These cases reveal the state’s broader effort to control women’s visibility, autonomy, and cultural participation through law. The ban on female solo singing is not an isolated rule; it is part of a broader legal framework that encompasses compulsory hijab enforcement, child marriage provisions, and marital obedience laws. Reports from CHRI and other rights monitors describe how Iran’s legal system constructs an environment where gendered exclusion is practiced, normalized, and institutionalized.

Although Iranian authorities frequently justify these restrictions by appealing to religious doctrine and “public morality,” the effect is to curtail women’s access to public life and self-expression. In this context, the regulation of voice itself becomes symbolic: appearing, speaking, and performing carry legal consequences when enacted by women.

Enforcement is not uniform across Iran. Women from Baluch, Kurdish, and Afghan communities experience compounded risks, including economic marginalization, limited access to legal aid, and increased surveillance. In these regions, gender-based restrictions can be even more severe, further entrenching systemic inequality.

Viewing these cases through the lens of gender apartheid shifts the focus from isolated acts of repression to a coherent legal and institutional structure that governs women’s roles in society. The arrests of Ahmady, Esmaeili, and Seyfizade demonstrate how artistic expression is criminalized not for its content but for the identity and visibility of the performer.

As international legal bodies debate recognising gender apartheid under international criminal law, including possible inclusion in the Rome Statute, these cases provide concrete evidence. They illustrate how law itself can become an instrument of exclusion, where the simple act of singing becomes a punishable offense because it is performed by a woman.